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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Introduction 
This paper is an attempt to think through the reforms in the recent 
White Paper on higher education in England, Students at the Heart 
of the System, and the reform of tuition fees and student loans that 
passed through Parliament at the end of 2010. It accepts the 
general approach of these reforms, which is: 
• to shift more of the burden of funding higher education to its 
users; 
• to make this shift in burden as fair as possible through 
‘progressive’ terms of repayment; 
• to allow good institutions to expand and bad ones to 
contract; 
• to make it easier for new market entrants to bring innovation 
to the sector; 
• to phase out ‘quotas’ on numbers of students; 
• to increase social mobility through higher education; 
• to put English higher education on a sustainable footing. 
However, the paper takes issue with the detail of the reforms put 
forward by the present government and presents alternative policies 
aimed at correcting (some of) their shortcomings. The idea is not to 
articulate precisely costed policies. Rather, it is to provide a set of 
policies that complement one another, the exact calibration of 
which remains flexible and should be based on more detailed 
economic analysis than can be provided here (but which Demos 
hopes to carry out in the near future). Thus the idea is to create a 
debate around what room for manoeuvre there is within the current 
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general policy framework as we enter the next political cycle in 2015 
(or perhaps sooner).  
The paper is focused on full-time undergraduate education and has 
little to say on other aspects of higher education such as 
postgraduate education and links between universities and 
businesses. Such other aspects are highly important and are not 
discussed here simply due to restrictions of space. The paper also 
does not come close to dealing with all the issues raised by the 
White Paper itself, again this is due to lack of space.  
 
Methodology 
This paper is the result of desktop research by the author and 
interviews with vice chancellors of English universities, to which the 
author owes a debt of gratitude. 
 
Key Argument 
This paper finds that the Government’s recent reforms of higher 
education have in some instances over-extended a free market 
approach and in other instances under-extended it. Rather than 
starting from an ideological position with regard to markets and the 
state (as the Browne Review seemed to do), the paper starts by 
defining what higher education is supposed to do – primarily, 
provide a ‘universal education’ where graduates become 
independent learners in their chosen fields. It then asks what has 
made English higher education successful (on the whole) in 
providing such an education, arguing that success is built on three 
principles: 
• open competition for the best students and staff; 
• institutional autonomy; 
• the ‘Robbins Principle’ which states that: 'courses of higher 
education should be available to all those who are qualified 
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by ability and attainment to pursue them and who wish to do 
so'. 
Thus when the paper advances an argument for a free-market 
approach, it does so because such an approach helps sustain these 
three principles. When it advocates some curtailment of the market, 
it is for the same reason. On the whole, it is argued that markets are 
well suited to maintaining the three principles which in turn 
encourage and allow institutions to focus on developing excellence 
in distinct educational missions (including when missions consist 
in providing a broad liberal arts education). 
However, where markets fall short the state should certainly act as 
funder, administrator and regulator of higher education, as it has 
done, largely successfully, in the past. This classic British 
compromise is not a fudge to be resolved by clear-sighted 
committees of economists. Rather, it is what has brought English 
higher education the success it currently enjoys.  
On analysis of the recent White Paper the following two conclusions 
are reached, which are the central claims of the paper and underpin 
the policy recommendations. 
• That the White Paper does not deal with the central 
impediment to an efficient, competitive and high quality 
sector, which is excess demand for student places. 
• That the damage to social mobility from locking out 
prospective students from higher education is likely to be 
greater than that of the debt averseness created by large 
loans. 
 
Key recommendations 
The following are intended as amendments of the general approach 
that has been adopted since the recent White Paper, not a radical 
rejection of that approach. However, some of the policy shifts called 
for are significant and would require political bravery to be 
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implemented (the full list of policy recommendations is at the end 
of the paper). -­‐ The Government must work towards reducing the cap on 
student numbers so that as many as possible of those who are 
capable of benefiting from higher education can do so, and so 
that supply and demand between degree places and 
prospective students are better matched. The current 
mismatch between supply and demand is by far the biggest 
impediment to bringing down fees and to introducing 
competition into the sector. The cap on student numbers also 
impedes social mobility by restricting access. Unmet demand 
could reach 100,000 individuals per year by 20201 making 
the cap a serious problem that must be addressed. -­‐ The Government must make the repayment terms of loans 
moderately less generous in order to bring down the 
unacceptably high level of loan write-off that will occur under 
current proposals. The anticipated high level of loan write-off 
(estimated to be between 32 per cent and 37 per cent of the 
loan book) is the major reason for a stringent cap on 
numbers (and hence is the major cause of the mismatch 
between supply and demand cited above). -­‐ The Government should, at the earliest possible date, start 
the process of removing all restrictions on the growth of 
higher education institutions beyond those imposed by any 
remaining cap on student numbers and the risk-based 
regulation and quality assurance assessments carried out by 
the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) 
and the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA). The ultimate aim 
should be to create a completely open market in terms of 
institutional expansion and contraction. -­‐ The Government should not allow institutional spend on 
bursaries to count towards Access Agreements. This would 
mean that the majority of bursaries and all fee waivers (see 
next recommendation) would be means-tested and centrally 
distributed through the existing student loans system, and 
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thus fair, well-targeted and easy to understand. Under the 
current system the complexity of deciding how much 
different university courses will cost is overwhelming, with 
candidates having to factor in different kinds of bursaries, 
loans, maintenance grants and fee waivers. Moreover, at the 
moment, students are paying (through higher fees) for 
bursaries for other students (hardly the most equitable way 
of funding social mobility). -­‐ The Government should ban universities from offering fee-
waivers so price is clearly signalled through tuition fees. 
Institutions are able to use fee waivers as a quick and easy 
way to satisfy Access Agreements whilst at the same time 
bringing net fees down so as to be able to bid for ‘margin’ 
places. This use of fee waivers to satisfy OFFA means less 
effort and resources are spent on what really increases social 
mobility: successful outreach programmes. -­‐ HEFCE should look to encourage the teaching of external 
degrees where 70 per cent of content is set and assessed by 
an external institution (e.g. the University of London, a 
professional body, an established education provider). The 
spread of external degrees would lead to efficiency savings 
whilst also driving up standards and reassuring employers 
and students about the quality of degrees. Allowing 30 per 
cent of an external degree to remain ‘in-house’ would 
preserve the ‘synergy’ between research and teaching that 
currently exists in most UK universities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
What is Higher Education for? 
 
Universitas – ‘the whole’; in late Latin ‘society, guild’ 
Universitas magistrorum et scholarium – ‘a community of teachers 
and scholars’ 
 
Higher education is not defined by being above level 4 in the 
current Qualifications and Credit Framework. It is defined by the 
idea of a university and a ‘universal education’.  
Thus, to understand the future we must go back to the past. The 
word university derives from the Latin universitas meaning ‘the 
whole’ and in later usage ‘society, guild’. A universal education took 
place in a ‘community of scholars and teachers’ that was bound by 
standards and norms protected by the state but independent of it. 
Most notably, scholars and teachers were bound by truth rather 
than power and from very early in Europe were given special 
dispensation to speak freely. 
The ‘society’ or ‘guild’ that a universal education took place in and 
through was concerned with ‘the whole’ in the sense of knowledge 
in its entirety, rather than knowledge of some specific thing like 
carpentry. This concern with the whole of knowledge should not 
lead us into thinking that the origins of a universal education lie in 
the modern concept of a liberal arts education. Granted, a universal 
education was originally scholarly and concerned with what we 
would today call the humanities. But such an education was soon 
expanded to include vocational scholarship and teaching – notably 
medicine and law. And anyway, in medieval times and even in early 
modernity, subjects like philosophy and theology were not seen as 
separate from subjects like medicine and law. The former were 
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considered the foundation of the latter and so common principles 
were held to span them both. 
Therefore the commonality amongst ‘academic’ and ‘vocational’ 
subjects in early universities was a commitment to learning the 
underlying principles of things. Once one understood these 
principles one could apply them for oneself to new phenomena, 
becoming an independent enquirer and so a member of the society 
or guild of scholars and teachers who were granted special 
dispensation to speak freely. 
In modern parlance we would call someone who had grasped the 
underlying principles of things an independent learner – someone 
who has ‘learned to learn’ in the fullest way.  
Despite the perceived divide between academic and vocational 
study at universities (e.g. studying the humanities versus studying 
law), the same commonality exists today between these two forms 
of study, just as it did in medieval and early modern times. The 
shared identity lies in the idea of grasping underlying principles so 
that one can apply them to new situations and learn new knowledge 
and techniques for oneself. 
For example, someone who has learned the principles of physics 
can apply them to a new problem in physics; someone who has 
learned the principles of engineering can apply them to building a 
new kind of bridge; someone who has learned the principles of 
literary criticism can apply them to a new text; someone who has 
learned philosophy can apply the principles of ethics to a new 
ethical problem; someone who has learned the principles of 
computer programming can apply them to creating a new kind of 
programme, and so on. 
Graduates of higher education are graduates of a universal 
education in the way just described – they are independent learners 
who have ‘learned how to learn’ within the parameters of some 
established body of knowledge or practice.  
The ‘graduate premium’ is paid because graduates are perceived to 
have acquired knowledge and skills to a high level. But also because 
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they can apply both of the latter to new situations and so are 
considered to be ‘self-starters’, ‘adaptable’, ‘flexible’, ‘creative’, 
possessors of ‘transferable skills’ etc. 
Hence the difference between a Higher National Diploma and a full 
degree in (for example) radiography should be that the graduate is 
not only able to operate equipment and carry out a set of technical 
routines; she can also, with little fuss, understand how to use any 
new piece of equipment and adapt to new routines quickly. How can 
she do this? Due to her having understood the underlying principles 
operative in her chosen field and hence having ‘learnt to learn’ 
within that field. 
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Box 1 
From past to future – the continued prevalence of the idea of a 
universal education in the English system 
 
It is the ‘gold standard’ of a universal education that should guide 
any regulation of standards in the expansion of higher education. 
Our thinking should be guided by looking up to this standard, not 
by the bureaucratic systems that have (or should have) been 
developed to help us protect and spread it (e.g. the UCAS tariff 
system; QCF). 
It does not matter whether a universal education is provided by the 
Open University via correspondence, or by some other institution 
providing a similar service online. Nor does it matter that further 
education colleges might provide much of the teaching and practical 
learning elements of a degree-standard education, which under the 
Government’s new White Paper they can expand in doing. What 
matters is that all providers reach the standard of a universal 
education and only enrol students capable of reaching this 
standard. 
The English system is perhaps uniquely placed in the world in terms 
of honouring the idea of a universal education. For example, in 
2010-11 a staggering 35 per cent of entrants to higher education had 
no qualifications recognised by UCAS.2 Some of these entrants will 
have had foreign qualifications or other level 3 qualifications not 
recognised in the tariff system, but we must presume that many of 
them were simply adults who did less well at school than their 
abilities allowed and whose talent for independent learning was 
spotted and nurtured by admissions officers. This level of informal 
entry to higher education shows that the English higher education 
sector is still firmly governed by the idea of a universal education 
and not by the qualifications bureaucracy designed to measure it. 
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SECTION 1 
What do universities do? What should they do? 
 
If the purpose of higher education is to provide a universal 
education, then how do universities do this? Very roughly, 
universities in the UK carry out the following functions: 
(a) General education  
Degree-level teaching that provides a general education – e.g. 
degrees in humanities 
(b) Vocational education  
Degree-level teaching that provides a vocational education – e.g. 
business studies degrees, law degrees 
(c) Professional accreditation 
Awarding professional accreditations such as degrees and post-
graduate degrees in dentistry, medicine, engineering, nursing, 
teaching and accountancy. 
(d) Cultivation and preservation of the arts and humanities 
Providing specialist training in the arts – e.g. music, drama and 
fine arts degrees; acting as guardians of learning and culture – 
for example, producing scholars in Middle English. 
(e) Research 
Carrying out scientific research of various kinds and other kinds 
of research such as social scientific research. 
(f) Partnerships in innovation 
Working with government, industry, the public sector and the 
third sector (e.g. Joseph Rowntree Foundation) to carry out 
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research and pursue knowledge of strategic importance to the 
economy and society, at both national and international levels 
(g) Partnerships in civic renewal 
Working in partnership with local authorities and other bodies 
to promote and sustain civil society and social projects (social 
partnerships, social enterprises). 
England has excellent provision in all these areas, although of 
course there is plenty of room for improvement. One proof of such 
excellence is the continued over-representation of UK universities 
in the top 100s of world university rankings, although these 
rankings should not be treated as definitive since they only measure 
one of the above functions, research output.3 Large numbers of 
foreign students also come to the UK to study, with a projected 
increase in applications from non EU applicants at the time of 
writing of 13 per cent.4 This rise must be balanced by a fall in non-
home EU applications of 11 per cent, probably due to rises in fee 
levels.  
Thus any analysis of the UK university sector must start from the 
fact that the system thus far has produced excellent results from 
modest inputs. Most European countries would dearly love to have 
universities of the world stature that the UK has, as well as the 
research outputs to match. 
 
Achieving excellence through distinct educational missions 
To recap the argument so far, it has been argued that higher 
education is concerned with providing a universal education, that 
there are various different ways universities can provide such an 
education, and that the English sector has been historically very 
successful at many of these.  
The argument now is that, at least in part, a market-based approach 
to English higher education is the best way of ensuring that 
universities – whether small or large, new or old, real or virtual – 
develop and sustain excellence in their distinct educational 
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missions. Each institution should decide which functions from the 
list above they can carry out well, in which proportions, and 
relentlessly pursue excellence. This is what universities should do 
and a market is a suitable framework in which to do it because it 
grants freedom to institutions to hone their offers, whilst at the 
same time focusing minds on the task at hand, since distinct 
excellence of mission will be one of the major selling points of an 
institution. 
Conversely, this paper rejects the idea that differentiation of 
mission leads inexorably to pernicious consequences. It is a logical 
mistake to think that if institutions pursue different missions (e.g. a 
Russell Group university concentrating on research; a Million+ 
university concentrating on teaching and learner support), that one 
mission will be highly esteemed and so high quality, and the other 
lowly esteemed and so low quality. Public esteem and quality of 
educational offer are not identical. People will esteem how they will 
and it is no business of government or universities to interfere in 
public attitudes. But what government and universities can do is 
support the relentless pursuit of excellence in the functions on 
which an institution chooses to focus. 
No-one thinks that we cannot have excellent kindergarten teaching, 
or social care, or primary school teaching, even if in the mind of the 
public the missions of kindergarten, care homes and primary 
schools are not esteemed as highly as those of Oxford colleges, blue-
chip companies or the Civil Service Fast Stream. Similarly, an ex-
College of Technology, such as Surrey University, can become a 
centre for excellence in international hospitality management, 
despite the great and the good of the chattering classes not 
esteeming it as highly as PPE at Oxford. Finally, a university such as 
London Metropolitan can pursue the mission of taking young 
people from deprived backgrounds and educating them to degree 
level despite substantial disadvantages (as long as the quality of 
degrees is not diminished in the process).  
All these distinct missions may be esteemed differently but that 
should not matter a jot: they are all worthwhile and what matters is 
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excellence in each mission rather than some utopian wish for a 
world where nothing is esteemed more highly than anything else. 
In the next section we will start by looking at what, at the macro-
level of sectoral organisation, England should do to enhance its 
ability to provide excellence within all the distinct (but often not 
separate) educational missions its universities undertake when they 
impart a universal education. We will then examine how English 
universities have traditionally provided excellence in their distinct 
missions, before moving on to discussing how such provision has 
been undermined by recent policy. Finally, we examine how the 
policy landscape after the recent White Paper can be improved so 
that a market in higher education can sustain and improve 
excellence in English universities, and so that the state can play the 
most fruitful role possible when it shapes and regulates that market. 
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SECTION 2 
Excellence in distinct missions – the market approach, 
‘differentiation’ and the three principles of English            
higher education 
 
There are roughly three ways higher education sectors can be 
organised: 
• by the state, as in France and Denmark; 
• almost entirely free of input from the state as in the case of 
Ivy League institutions in the US; 
• through a combination of state input and sectoral autonomy 
(as is the case in the UK). 
Although these categories are somewhat indistinct – for example, 
Ivy League universities benefit from state subsidies through student 
loans – they are useful in deciding the best way for the UK higher 
education institutions to develop excellence in their distinct 
educational missions (for the sector to ‘differentiate’ itself in a 
positive manner to the maximal degree).  
In deciding how English higher education achieves maximal 
differentiation, as much weight must be given to history as is given 
to arguments from first principles. Roger-Francois Gauthier has 
recently argued that educational systems are not rational entities to 
be organised solely according to strategic aims and objectives.5 They 
are rather historical entities rooted in culture, tradition and 
established practice. 
 
How should England organise its higher education sector?  
Arguments about how to organise the higher education sector at a 
macro-level are really arguments about differentiation – that is, 
how do we get maximum quality and value from the sector in terms 
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of the functions identified earlier? Arguments for a free market 
approach usually cite the success of the Ivy League universities in 
the US, the income of which overwhelmingly comes from 
endowments, partnerships with business, private contributions by 
alumni and student fees. The high degree of autonomy enjoyed by 
these institutions certainly allows them to pursue cutting-edge 
research and to relentlessly pursue excellence by investing huge 
amounts in staff and infrastructure. 
However, it would be a mistake to think that such institutions are 
completely free of state input – for example, they benefit from state 
funding of student loans and state investment in strategic research. 
Moreover, these institutions are not a good model for the UK 
because their excellence in large part depends on a culture of 
alumni donation and a legacy of huge financial endowments. The 
UK has no such culture or legacy of any significance and has a very 
long history of state input into universities that has not, to any great 
extent, compromised institutional autonomy and academic 
freedoms. Whilst medieval Italian universities such as Bologna were 
supported by princes and noble men and French universities by the 
church, England’s medieval universities were protected by the state 
against religious interference and undue influence from the rich and 
powerful.  
In the last two centuries the state has had a major role to play in 
building and funding universities but has done so whilst allowing 
UK institutions, particularly those operating under Royal Charter, a 
great deal of autonomy. Although some would say the success of UK 
higher education is despite, not because of, state input, the latter 
must be reasonably benign for this success to have occurred.  
The most damning argument against a complete free market in 
higher education comes from the fact that one exists nowhere in the 
world. The Ivy League universities in the United States operate in a 
system that has many differentiated parts – Community Colleges 
offering associate degrees, State Universities, four-year private 
providers of general education (liberal arts colleges) and research-
intensive private universities (including the Ivy League). This 
degree of differentiation is only achieved because the US state 
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invests a far higher amount of money than the UK in higher 
education, with a substantial amount of government funding going 
to Community Colleges and State Universities (e.g. in 2007 the US 
spent 3.1 per cent of GDP on higher education whereas the UK 
spent 0.7 per cent). Even in a system such as South Korea’s, which 
gets 80 per cent of provision from the private sector (and has 80 
per cent of its young people enter higher education), it would be an 
error to describe higher education there as operating within a 
totally free market, as the government is heavily involved in 
regulating and funding the tertiary sector.6 
What of the state-run model adopted by France and Denmark? The 
latter country has recently reorganised its system along 
differentiated lines, splitting off three ‘world-class’ research 
institutes from eight universities focused more on general 
education.7 However, one vice chancellor interviewed for this paper 
described Denmark as ‘irrelevant’ since it is a small country with a 
population less than London’s, and it does seem that maximising 
excellence and value through central planning is not germane to a 
diverse and (comparatively) large country like England. Denmark, 
can act like a well-organised (albeit very large) corporation; 
England cannot.  
Moreover, in the course of writing this paper various vice 
chancellors and commentators were interviewed who warned that 
England needed a more strategic approach to planning and funding 
higher education. However, none were in favour of a centrally 
organised system such as Denmark’s. In fact, all seemed convinced 
that England suited some sort of market approach with decision-
making decentralised to autonomous institutions, lest we are to 
ignore Gauthier’s injunction to take seriously the history and 
culture of educational systems. 
But what of France? France has organised its system centrally and 
according to different functions, although with a strong attachment 
to traditions that do not make its system particularly rational. The 
highly selective Grand Ecoles (not actually universities) educate the 
elite for academia, government, business and the civil service, and 
for study in specialist subjects such as science, architecture and 
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engineering. The public universities provide what might be termed 
a ‘general education’ at degree level and are the closest equivalent to 
English universities. French public universities also provide non-
selective education for business and industry. Research areas at 
these universities are largely assigned to institutions according to 
distinct subject areas (although individual institutions belong to 
research ‘clusters’). Could this be a model for the UK?  
There are few voices calling for the UK to reorganise its sector along 
the lines of France, primarily because academics in the UK are 
strongly wedded both to institutional autonomy and the idea of 
preserving the ‘synergy’ between research and teaching, as well as 
the ‘cross-fertilisation’ the diversity of departments within an 
English university often brings about. It is due to the importance of 
cross-fertilisation and the synergy between research and teaching 
that the French Education secretary, Valerie Pecresse, is currently 
exploring how the French system could be more like the English.8 A 
further unhelpful idiosyncrasy of the French system is that public 
universities cannot be selective at all beyond insisting on a basic 
competence to undertake higher education. This feature of the 
system seriously harms the ability of public universities to pursue 
excellence in distinct educational missions (i.e. they are unable to 
develop degree schemes that only attract some of the best students 
in a given field). 
Whilst vice chancellors and other commentators who spoke to 
Demos acknowledged that a shift back towards teaching quality 
over research output (as envisaged by the recent White Paper) was 
needed to a small extent, concern was expressed over too much of a 
reorientation towards teaching via institutions focussed solely on it 
(as in Denmark and the US). Russell Group universities might be 
expected to argue that it is in the synthesis of cutting edge research 
and teaching that their unique offer lies. But a prominent vice 
chancellor from a Million+ university expressed to Demos that he 
saw the key to high quality teaching in this synthesis too. In this 
regard, there seems to be relief that research grants have not been 
cut but also a worry that target-chasing in terms of proxies for good 
teaching (such as numbers of contact hours), could detract from the 
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unique ‘synergy’ of research and teaching typical of English 
universities. As this same vice chancellor put it: 
I like the idea that you live in a community which thrives on a synergy 
between new ideas and existing ideas. And that is one loosely between 
research and education. I like the idea that there will be teaching 
fellowships in a variety of different areas in the sector, but I don’t want 
that to be seen as a breakdown between the fundamental synergy 
between education and research. There are ways of doing that by 
having some research only and teaching only and a broader range of 
staff doing both but I think there is just a need to recognise that synergy 
is in fact what defines the university. 
Of course some higher education institutions are very much focused 
on teaching in a more narrow range of subjects than the traditional 
university – for example, teacher training colleges, music 
conservatoires, new market entrants focused on professional 
accreditation in law – and there is nothing wrong with such focus as 
long as students know what they are choosing and academic 
standards are maintained. However, the untrammelled growth of 
such institutions at the expense of institutions where research and 
teaching constantly bump up against one another would not be a 
desirable outcome for English higher education. Certainly maximal 
differentiation should be sought in the system so that each 
institution pursues excellence in its distinct missions. But for the 
majority of institutions distinctness of mission is defined by the 
synergy between research and teaching. 
A recent pamphlet from CentreForum argued for the separation of 
teaching and research, and whilst making sense in terms of 
efficiencies and economies of scale, this kind of reform, if rolled out 
too widely, would be completely out of kilter with the history of 
English universities and what makes them successful.9 However, 
accepting the need for a large amount of synergy and cross-
fertilisation, institutions still need to be sure of their mission and to 
continually hone it. 
Autonomy, research–teaching synergy and cross-fertilisation are all 
historically well-established features of the English system. But they 
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are also probably features any university system would seek to 
emulate if it were to succeed in a complex global economy – one in 
which, dynamic, somewhat creative and entrepreneurial 
institutions are most likely to succeed.  
These arguments lead us to embrace – in a hopefully non-
Panglossian way – the very system we seem to possess; a broadly 
market-oriented higher education sector with a high degree of 
institutional autonomy but with a reasonable amount of regulation, 
funding and strategic guidance still coming from central 
government. The question then becomes what kind of balance is to 
be struck between a free market and government input, in order to 
create maximal differentiation in the system; that is, differentiation 
with regard to developing distinct but excellent educational 
missions?  
In what follows it is argued that in order to achieve the maximal 
differentiation the market-based approach of the recent White 
Paper should be extended in some instances yet in others drawn 
back. Rather than start from a presumption that it is only system-
level reform based on either markets or state that will work, this 
paper begins from the premise that England’s higher education 
system is historically one where both operate together (and to great 
success). The real spade-work for policymakers lies in deciding in 
which precise ways state and market should be married, given the 
strengths of the English system and its current weaknesses. 
 
Strengths of the English higher education sector 
The ‘three principles’ of success in English higher education post 
WWII have been the following: 
• competition for the best students and staff amongst 
universities and the judging of universities on the calibre of 
their student intake;  
• the institutional autonomy granted to universities, especially 
with regard to the relative freedom of movement of 
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academics so that they can build centres of research 
excellence, according to international meritocratic standards, 
rather than standards mired in patronage and bureaucracy;  
• the ‘Robbins Principle’ which states that: ‘courses of higher 
education should be available to all those who are qualified 
by ability and attainment to pursue them and who wish to   
do so’. 
Thus in English universities, excellence in teaching and research 
have been driven by the demands of prospective students who are 
themselves merit-based candidates from a wide variety of 
backgrounds (although not as wide as might be liked), and by the 
freedom with which institutions can deploy both capital and high-
quality staff.  
When we discuss the future of universal education in England, we 
should always bear in mind the ‘three principles’ just listed. For the 
‘synergy’ between research and teaching, and the cross-fertilisation 
across departments in English universities, are both products of 
institutions facing outwards to the needs of meritocratically chosen 
students, as well as to the honest appraisal of the international 
research community. 
 
From strengths to weaknesses 
This paper has been largely positive about English higher education 
– asking the reader to resist the doom-laden narratives that bemoan 
the decline of English universities and recognise that the sector has 
in fact been uniquely successfully in international terms. However, 
it would not be right to suggest there is no danger lurking.  
Where there has been concern over higher education in England it 
has been, broadly speaking, in the following six areas:  
• concern over social mobility with too few poorer students 
attending ‘elite’ institutions; 
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• concern over a fall in academic standards following the 
expansion of student places;  
• concern over increases in bureaucracy and managerialism; 
• concern over a retreat from teaching and an over-
concentration in research; 
• concern over whether elite universities are able to generate 
enough income to compete in a global market; 
• concern that too many young people are taking degrees so 
that the latter are devalued and the country is inefficiently 
over-educating its workforce. 
Whether all these concerns are justified is a moot point, but there 
are certainly elements of all that are. 
The recent White Paper attempted to respond to all of these 
concerns in one way or another. It is not possible here to gauge how 
successful all these responses will be. Rather, the focus is on the 
following two areas: 
• costs, competition and institutional autonomy; 
• social mobility and access to higher education. 
The next section analyses weaknesses in the approach taken by the 
White Paper with regard to these three areas of concern, all the time 
with the three principles of success in English higher education in 
mind. In the section that follows the next, a menu of policy 
recommendations is advanced that could help to correct some of the 
weaknesses of the White Paper. 
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SECTION 3 
Building on the White Paper 
 
Shifting to the majority of funding for higher education coming 
from students 
Before we look at specific policies that might support a healthy 
market in English higher education, we need to deal with the basic 
question of why students should pay more for their degrees. To 
answer this we must remember that the UK, and England within it, 
is currently facing a multi-faceted debt crisis – a structural deficit, 
large private sector and individual debt, a large government debt 
and large unfunded commitments such as Public Finance Initiative 
(PFI) schemes and public sector pensions. But there has also been a 
general decline in the opportunities for growth for the UK within a 
world economy increasingly shifting towards the so-called BRIC 
countries, and with the recent troubles in the Eurozone. Moreover, 
with increased longevity and the retirement of the baby-boomers, 
the UK faces massive increases in the costs of pensions and health 
and social care. 
Within this economic climate, savings must be made wherever they 
can be. Graduates are prime candidates to save the state money 
since there are variable but often large private gains associated with 
obtaining a degree – for example, higher wages, as well as personal 
gains in wellbeing.10 Moreover, recent Demos research has shown 
that a university education significantly protects against 
unemployment.11 There are of course also public gains from these 
private goods – such as lower unemployment rates and increased 
productivity, as well as more obvious public goods including but not 
limited to the development of socially and economically important 
skills (e.g. medical skills). 
In times of less debt and with a different demographic situation, on 
balance it might be argued that, due to the public goods that accrue 
from higher education, individuals should not be expected to pay 
too much for their degrees. However, we are in the times we are in 
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and, given the considerable accrual of private goods by graduates, it 
seems asking them to contribute more is justified. However, it is a 
premise of this paper that higher education should be sustainable 
over the long-term, not forced to make severe savings for the sake of 
short-term budgetary targets. Since the UK’s low and stable 
borrowing costs are largely due to the average maturity of its debt 
being around 14 years,12 it seems that what the markets care about 
is the long-term health of the UK economy, not short-term plans 
based around the political cycle. 
Therefore the position taken here is broadly supportive of the shift 
of costs from state to individual in higher education, so that a 
majority of the funding is student-led. Nevertheless, in what follows 
serious misgivings are expressed about the precise combination of 
student debt, capped overall student numbers and market 
incentives that the Government has proposed.  
 
Costs, competition and autonomy 
The White Paper tries to marry together what would indeed be a 
marvellous pair of complements: on the one hand, efficiency 
savings through market diversification and greater competition for 
students; on the other hand, greater quality of provision (namely 
teaching) achieved through student choice. Hence with ‘students at 
the heart of the system’ costs should go down and quality should go 
up. Or that’s the idea anyway. 
The first thing to say is that such a happy state of affairs could be 
achieved, as long as one’s expectations are modest. For a start, the 
input costs for higher education are hard to reduce dramatically 
without damaging quality. There could be some savings in terms of 
splitting up research and teaching functions so that not all 
academics are paid for research time (e.g. sabbaticals). There is also 
undoubtedly scope for new market entrants to focus on teaching in 
niche areas like professional accreditations and deliver excellence 
whilst keeping costs low due to not having to pay for research. But 
many universities have already gone quite far in this direction (e.g. 
through the employment of teaching assistants) and it is not clear 
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how much more distance could be travelled without losing the 
‘synergy’ between research and teaching that marks out most good 
English higher education. Moreover, the greater power of student 
choice in the new system is just as likely to push costs up as 
students expect more contact time with staff who are leaders in 
their fields. 
There are other efficiency savings that could be made, such as 
pooling administrative and other ‘back office’ functions, but the 
reduction in costs such initiatives are likely to produce will be small 
beer. Other initiatives, like two-year degrees and more good-quality 
online learning are to be welcomed as giving students more choice 
and creating efficiencies, but again, there is no evidence that 
savings from such initiatives will be huge. 
However, it is not idle to hold that greater competition between 
institutions and greater student choice, within a system where fees 
remained capped, will both improve quality of provision by forcing 
a relentless focus on excellence in distinct missions, whilst at the 
same time creating modest savings in terms of fees through greater 
competition (and modest savings are not to be sniffed at when they 
are year-on-year). So the problem is not that modest savings could 
not be coupled with improvements in quality. It is that in some 
respects, the White Paper actually stands in the way of this 
coupling. 
The basic problem that the White Paper does not tackle is that 
excess demand for degree places means institutions are not under 
particular pressure to bring down costs and raise standards. There 
was of course a large amount of pressure bearing down on 
institutions to maintain standards under the old system of HEFCE 
grant funding – any institution dropping standards too far would 
quickly find itself having to work very hard to attract enough 
students. But the White Paper stakes the house on ‘student choice’ 
driving up quality considerably, whilst at the same time driving 
down costs. However, as long as there is excess demand in the 
system, institutions will be under no great pressure to work towards 
achievable modest reductions in costs, nor to greatly push up 
quality through keener focus on distinct missions. 
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Controls on student numbers (or ‘quotas’ as the White Paper calls 
them) have been in place since 2008 and their purpose is to protect 
the Exchequer from excess costs due to the rising demand for 
higher education. Since the reforms of the White Paper one might 
think that such controls could be lifted, with students paying fees 
themselves and a massive reduction in HEFCE grant. However, due 
to the generous terms of the loan repayments system, the 
Government has had to revise its estimates of the Resource Account 
Budgeting (RAB) charge for unpaid student loans.  
The Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) estimates 
that the RAB charge could be as high as 32 per cent13 and one study 
put it as high as 37 per cent.14 Given that the 32 per cent figure is 
based on past patterns in graduate wage growth, and given the fact 
that the graduate premium is much more variable than it was once 
considered to be, it is quite plausible that the BIS estimate of the 
RAB charge is somewhat optimistic. If that is the case, then the 
terms of student loan repayment adopted by the Government look 
as if they may have to be revised. In the meantime, the Government 
has no plans to reduce the cap on student numbers since that would 
mean storing up even more bad debt for future generations. 
So despite the White Paper railing against the complacency in the 
sector that ‘quotas’ give rise to, it has left in place the main 
impediment to reducing complacency, the tight control of student 
numbers and the excess demand in the system this causes. 
Work by HEPI estimates the excess demand for student places in 
2010-2011 to have been approximately 60,000 individuals (a figure 
that is much lower than newspaper headlines but which properly 
identifies genuine unmet demand).15 However, more troublingly, 
HEPI estimates that unmet demand is likely to rise to 100,000 by 
2020.16 This estimate is based on a higher fertility rate amongst 
more affluent families, the continued increase in participation in 
higher education amongst disadvantaged groups, improvements in 
boys’ progression to level 3 qualifications and the raising of the 
compulsory participation age to 18 in 2015. One might add to this 
list the adoption of the Ebac performance measure and a 
Department for Education generally pushing curricula in a more 
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academic direction – in short, DfE policy on schools is aimed at 
raising academic attainment but BIS has no plans to accommodate 
the increase in demand for higher education likely to result. 
Thus the White Paper leaves in place the following triumvirate of 
mutually reinforcing factors: the high cost of the RAB charge for 
student loans necessitates a stringent cap on student numbers, 
which ensures excess demand in the system, which in turn reduces 
pressure on institutions to drive down costs and increase quality.  
The Government has come up with a number of fixes to try to break 
this vicious circle and create a healthy market that marries 
moderately reduced costs with increased quality. However, these 
fixes have too many unintended consequences that threaten the 
three principles of success in English higher education outlined 
above. Below we list some of these consequences before going on in 
the next section to outline policy recommendations that might turn 
the vicious circle just cited into a virtuous one. 
 
Unintended consequences of government regulation of 
competition 
The White Paper has attempted to introduce more competition into 
the higher education sector in four ways. 
First, institutions are allowed to enrol as many ‘higher threshold’ 
students (those with grades at AAB+) as they like. In effect, the 
65,000 AAB+ students who start degrees each year are ‘off quota’. 
Second, once AAB+ students are put to one side, an institution has 
its ‘core’ allocation of non-AAB+ places reduced by 8 per cent. It 
can then bid for as many places as it thinks it can successfully win 
from the pool of 20,000 ‘margin’ places created by this top-slicing 
process. The allocation of ‘margin’ places is decided by HEFCE 
panel. Institutions can only compete for ‘margin’ places if their 
average net-fees are below £7,500. 
Third, it is to be made easier for new market entrants, including 
private institutions, to provide higher education in the UK. 
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Fourth, with greater provision of information, student choice is to 
push institutions into providing higher quality education for less 
money. 
Here we demur on the third and fourth strategies. In terms of the 
first two, the Government announced its intention in the White 
Paper to continue to increase the pool of ‘margin’ places, and to 
lower the ‘higher threshold’ from AAB+ over the life of this 
parliament. However, there are a number of perverse incentives and 
market distortions that arise from increasing competition in this 
way: 
• Many Russell Group universities (e.g. Manchester and 
Oxford) have developed expertise in offering places to 
prospective students below AAB from less-affluent 
backgrounds by considering ‘contextual data’. Many of these 
students go on to do just as well or better than AAB+ 
candidates. The new unlimited expansion of AAB+ places, in 
tandem with the reduction of non-AAB+ places, would mean 
an institution could well be less likely to continue to make 
such offers, thus harming social mobility. 
• Many STEM subjects are considered extremely hard at ‘A’ 
level and candidates are much less likely to get the highest 
grades. The Government has made expansion of many STEM 
subjects a national priority. HEFCE has removed STEM 
subjects (and other ‘strategically important subjects’) from 
the 8 per cent top slice of ‘margin’ places. Yet many 
universities may think twice about taking students for STEM 
subjects with non-AAB+ grades if students above this 
threshold can be recruited in unlimited fashion. 
• With non-A level qualifications included in the AAB+ ‘higher 
threshold’ criteria it will become increasingly difficult to 
police inclusion in this group creating a greater burden on 
administrative officers and leading to the gaming of the 
system. 
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• The Government says it wants to raise academic standards – 
hence the Ebac performance measure and the mooted move 
to make A* at A level harder to achieve. But if AAB+ students 
can be recruited in unlimited fashion, more prospective 
students are likely to study ‘easier’ subjects at A level or to 
game the system by taking the same subject twice with two 
different exam boards. 
• Allowing ‘elite’ institutions to mop up AAB+ students will put 
pressure on ‘middle tier’ universities to reduce fees to an 
average of £7,500, once the number of ‘margin’ places is 
increased, putting them in competition with the ‘bottom’ 
rather than the ‘top’ of the sector. It is not clear this bi-polar 
system is desirable, since it may eventually make extinct a 
certain kind of valuable institution, as well as reduce 
competitive pressure on ‘elite’ universities, leading to two 
markedly differentiated markets, rather than a whole host of 
differentiated markets ranging from the top to bottom of the 
sector. 
• Only allowing competition for ‘margin’ places with average 
fees of £7,500 may lead to levelling prices up as much as 
levelling them down. With a strict cap on numbers and 
supply exceeding demand, new market-entrants, FE colleges 
and newer universities may well be motivated to raise their 
fees up to an average of £7,500 (especially as cost does not 
form part of the HEFCE panels’ decision-making rubric – see 
next bullet point). 
• An institution’s bid for ‘margin’ places will not be decided by 
student choice but by HEFCE panel, creating a large new 
bureaucratic decision-making process. As the ‘margin’ 
expands, more and more student places will be allocated by 
such panels. Hardly putting student choice at the heart of the 
system and hardly supporting the tradition of institutional 
autonomy amongst English universities. 
• There are concerns about the growth of merit-based, rather 
than need-based, scholarships, in order for institutions to 
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attract ‘higher threshold’ students. Merit-based bursaries 
have a proven negative impact on social mobility, becoming 
largely cornered by the upper middle classes (as research 
from the US attests).17 Moreover, the Higher Education 
Policy Institute (HEPI) has warned that a bidding ‘arms race’ 
will start between middle-tier institutions over attracting the 
best students and that such a race could prove financially 
ruinous.18 
 
No doubt ad hoc amendments could be found for many of these 
unintended consequences but as such fixes pile up the system will 
become more and more complex and burdensome for institutions. 
But until demand better matches supply, and thus until the RAB 
charge for student loan write-offs is reduced, proper competition 
will not be reintroduced into the English higher education sector. 
Moreover, since social mobility is largely a product of increasing 
participation in higher education (this has certainly been the case in 
the past), the estimated 100,000 applicants locked out of higher 
education by 2020 is arguably of greater concern than debt aversity 
deterring applications to university. It is difficult to estimate the 
effects of debt aversity on participation in higher education – or in 
other words, to estimate the effects of the recent massive increases 
in tuitions fees on participation. At the time of writing, applications 
are down 8 per cent on the previous year (2011-12)19 but the 
deadline for applications is not yet closed and there is evidence that 
applicants are leaving it late to decide, since at the end of November 
2011 applications were down 15 per cent year on year.20  
A BBC survey found one in ten prospective students might not go to 
university due to increased fees.21 If we take the results of this 
survey at face value (which we probably should not) then arguably 
the locking out of 100,000 applicants from higher education in 
2020 is a significantly bigger problem for social mobility than 
raised fees. Why is this? The annual cohort of full-time 
undergraduates is approximately 360,000,22 which means by 2020 
a group larger than one quarter of this cohort could be locked out. 
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Surely this is a flagrant and harmful violation of the Robbins 
Principle that deserves much more attention than it is getting? 
Given the vicious circle of student cap/high RAB charge/lack of 
competition/higher than necessary fees, and given the social harm 
done by the locking out of so many students from the system by 
2020, we conclude that in the medium and long-term the 
Government must take steps to break this vicious circle and open 
up more places in higher education. This conclusion, in conjunction 
with the continuing economic stagnation in the UK, leads us in the 
next section to some very tough policy choices.
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SECTION 4  
Policy recommendations 
 
These recommendations are designed to break the vicious circle of 
high RAB charge/student cap/excess demand/lack of 
competition/higher fees/high RAB charge etc. etc. They are meant 
to show that within the current policy framework changes can be 
made that will open up more places and create a healthy market. 
The recommendations are also meant to preserve the three 
principles of success in English higher education, namely: 
• open competition for the best students and staff; 
• institutional autonomy; 
• the ‘Robbins Principle’ which states that: 'courses of higher 
education should be available to all those who are qualified 
by ability and attainment to pursue them and who wish to   
do so'. 
Due to limits on the author’s time, the policy options are not fully 
costed and further research would be needed to carry out such 
costing (Demos hopes to carry out this research). The idea is to 
provide a menu of policy options that can be calibrated more 
precisely based on further economic modelling. 
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Policy: Make repayment terms on loans for fees and maintenance 
moderately less generous 
Outcomes: Less money lost through writing off loans; this money 
could be used to pay for more student places, reducing excess 
demand and thus increasing competition amongst institutions as 
well as increasing social mobility through greater participation in 
higher education. 
Currently, repayment terms on student loans are too generous. Not 
because they make repayments eminently manageable for graduates 
(£67.50 a month when earning £30,000 per annum), which is 
obviously to be applauded, but because they are so generous that it 
is estimated that between 32 per cent and 37 per cent of loans will 
eventually be written off by the Treasury. Some combination of the 
following could significantly reduce the RAB charge from loan 
write-offs: 
• a lowering of the threshold at which loans are repaid; 
• a scrapping of the 30-year time limit on loans so that loans 
are liable to be repaid over a person’s whole working life; 
• an increase in the ‘real’ rate of interest on loans that is 
charged to higher earners; 
• a slight increase in the ‘tax’ on earnings above the threshold 
for repayment (the ‘tax’ is currently set at 9 per cent). 
A combination of these changes could be implemented without 
jeopardising the ‘progressive’ nature of the repayments scheme. 
Such changes could substantially reduce the RAB charge for loan 
write-offs and fund an expansion of student places.23 
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Policy: Reduce, as far as possible, the cap on student numbers 
Outcomes: Supply and demand for places in higher education 
could be better matched, putting much more effective pressure on 
universities to reduce fees which would have the effect of reducing 
the future RAB charge; social mobility can be aided through 
greater access to HE 
In a liberal society, where individuals are expected to become 
financially and socially independent, rationing a primary route to 
such independence is to be avoided if at all possible. Arguments 
based on a vague notion that too many people are going into higher 
education are unfounded. There is no ‘right’ level of higher 
education for an economy or society, with South Korea educating 
around 80 per cent of its population to this level. Higher education 
is by no means an unconditional good, but there is evidence to 
suggest that in advanced economies like the UK, it bolsters 
economic growth.24 There are also social benefits to having many 
people receive a universal education, such as better health and 
better outcomes for children who have better educated parents.25 
Substantially reducing the cap on student numbers could be paid 
for by less generous repayment rates on loans (see above) but the 
measure itself would very likely reduce per capita costs to the 
Treasury since supply would better match demand thus forcing 
universities to drive down fees in order to attract students. 
Moreover, with slightly more arduous repayment terms, students 
would be even more incentivised to choose degrees that offer value 
for money. 
Reducing the cap will also do much for social mobility. Ironically, 
under current plans, fees are being inflated in order to pay for 
bursaries and fee waivers to satisfy Access Agreements, all in the 
name of reducing fees for poorer students! Lower fees through 
supply matching demand are desirable for increasing access to HE. 
But the single biggest boost to social mobility would be the 
expansion of places. 
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Policy: Open up all university places to open competition amongst 
all institutions, creating a proper market without perverse 
incentives and distortions 
Outcomes: Differentiated market driven by student choice not 
arbitrary regulation of price and HEFCE panel; reduction of 
damaging unintended consequences of the Government’s present 
policies on competition 
 
As was detailed above, the Government regulating the market in 
terms of only allowing expansion for AAB+ places and places at 
universities with fees on average at or below £7,500, yields many 
unintended consequences that are harmful to social mobility, that 
reduce institutional autonomy, and that polarise the market in a 
way that undermines competition. 
With complete open competition for places, universities could 
adopt expansion or consolidation plans that would rest on nothing 
other than the merit of their courses and student choice. When it 
came to increasing access through lowering grade requirements, 
they would be free to use their own judgement. And a polarisation 
of the market along the lines of ‘elite’ research universities and ‘the 
rest’ would not be encouraged by funding structures. Of course, 
strong differentiation would still exist between ‘top, middle and 
bottom’, but there would be plenty of gradations of quality and price 
in between. As things stand, the Government risks destroying the 
middle tier universities simply because of pricing structure. If these 
universities are complacent or overstretched, their refocusing on a 
distinct educational mission should be driven by student choices, 
not HEFCE panel. 
It is doubtful whether complete open competition would lead to 
rapid expansion or contraction amongst institutions at least in the 
medium term. Changes in student populations would probably not 
be any greater than were allowed under the ‘tolerance bands’ 
system that was in place in the 1990s. Some new institutions might 
expand rapidly, as was the case with ex-polytechnics in the early 
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1990s, but on the whole change in institutional size should occur at 
manageable speeds. 
 
Policy: Maintain tight controls on degree awarding powers 
through the Privy Council and encourage the use of external 
degrees 
Outcomes: Maintaining and improving standards with clearer 
signalling on quality; economies of scale created that will lead to 
savings 
The new regulatory framework proposed by the White Paper should 
help with policing the open market outlined above. With regulatory 
burden parsed in terms of risk, new entrants will be policed 
intensively, hopefully ensuring a ‘race to the bottom’ does not 
ensue.  
The White Paper also proposes making it easier for institutions and 
bodies to award degrees – this move should be resisted if it goes 
beyond streamlining needless bureaucracy to lowering the bar in 
terms of quality assurance and risk assessment. In a choice-led 
system, neither students nor employers will be helped by even more 
uncertainty about the quality of degrees. This isn’t to say that new 
degree-awarding powers shouldn’t be granted, rather that the 
process to win such powers should be rigorous, demonstrating 
ability to maintain standards over a period of time. 
In lieu of new degree awarding powers, new institutions should be 
encouraged by HEFCE, where appropriate, to work to external 
degree programmes where at least 70 per cent of content is assessed 
by an existing and respected degree-awarding institution, 
professional body or established education provider. Such external 
degrees will reassure students and employers that a certain level of 
quality has been reached and that such quality will be maintained, 
as is the case, for example, with the external degree arrangements 
already offered by the University of London. The separation of 
teaching, grading and curriculum design should be a force for more 
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objectivity in the higher education sector, reducing the variation of 
degree quality. 
Moreover, the awarding of external degrees should not be restricted 
to new market entrants. There is already a plethora of institutions 
in England that offer a huge number of degrees. Some of these 
degrees have been offered not particularly to serve the needs of 
students but the research interests of academics. Of course it is 
good that academics get to teach the subjects they are researching 
and are most passionate about – this ‘synergy’ of research and 
teaching is what has made English higher education so successful. 
But the best degrees all have large elements of standard practice 
and canonical knowledge that students must learn, and these 
should be able to stand scrutiny from external assessment and thus 
be more or less interchangeable across institutions. 
As a result of the move to a more market-based system, some 
universities have moved to streamline their offer (e.g. London 
Metropolitan University). This is welcome as a way of focussing 
minds and resources on excellence in distinct educational missions. 
It would be natural to build on this streamlining trend by 
rationalising many degrees into far fewer but better respected and 
policed external degrees, so that employers and students had more 
of a guarantee of quality. Such a move would also go a long way 
towards protecting the reputation of English universities in a 
globally competitive market. 
Finally, handing over the majority of curriculum design and grading 
to an external institution (at least 70 per cent) will lead to efficiency 
savings, whilst ensuring that a certain amount of synergy between 
research and teaching is retained at the majority of institutions, 
with 20-30 per cent of content still developed and taught by an 
institution’s own academics. With time savings on curriculum 
design and assessment, institutions could focus better on teaching, 
pastoral care and employability training, so that they develop 
excellence in these missions (while being held to exacting external 
academic standards). And they could improve such focus at a price 
below the present average fee that institutions are charging for 
undergraduate degrees. Lower fees could be achieved partly 
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through economies of scale and savings on research time for 
academics. But they could also be achieved through innovations 
such as teaching degrees over two years with shorter holidays as 
well as through high-quality digital teaching materials.  
 
Policy: Instruct research councils to make more research funding 
available in small, easy-to-access grants for individual academics 
to keep up with the literature in their field and write books. 
Outcomes: Research money still reaches a large number of 
academics maintaining (alongside a 70/30 per cent 
external/internal degree scheme) a synergy between research and 
teaching at the majority of English higher education institutions; 
the trend towards every kind of university department 
‘professionalising’ and basing educational missions on large 
research programmes (and hiring only staff with strong 
publishing records) would be countered, doing much more than 
the publishing of contact hours to reorient academics towards 
teaching. 
This is a policy that would apply perhaps more to the arts and 
humanities and some social sciences than it would to the hard 
sciences (since the latter often do require large-scale intra- and 
inter-institutional collaborations to carry out effective research), 
but it would still go a long way to creating a funding structure that 
re-aligns academics towards teaching, whilst also maintaining a 
high level of research-awareness amongst UK academics. As we 
have seen, the synergy between research and teaching is an 
important aspect of English higher education and this policy would 
reorient institutions towards teaching whilst maintaining such 
synergy.  
In a way, this policy would make it possible for the kind of academic 
to exist that did in the 1960s and 1970s – someone who was 
passionate about teaching and passing on knowledge to students 
but who also kept abreast of all the latest developments in his or her 
field, perhaps publishing two or three books over a career. Such 
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academics have been squeezed out by professionalised ‘publishing 
drones’ who know how to get articles in the best peer-reviewed 
journals but are not interested (and have not been told to be 
interested) in teaching undergraduates or writing books that the 
educated general public might read. Of course, we need highly 
specialised and research-oriented academics and the 
professionalisation of English academia over the last thirty years 
has in many ways helped it maintain its share of a global market 
(since peer-reviewed research is the hard currency of international 
academia). But there is no doubt that this professionalising model 
has been spread too far and too thinly and the result has been the 
sad loss of the dedicated academic who primarily teaches but also 
does some research. 
 
Policy: Draw up a national charter on academic standards and 
fund it in part through a levy on businesses 
Outcomes: The preservation of standards at English universities; 
sending a signal to world markets that English universities have 
high standards 
One of the major issues that White Paper does not deal with – or 
rather only deals with through the limited means of student choice 
– is the upholding and improving of academic standards. As has 
already been argued, the wider adoption of external degrees and 
strict regulation around degree-awarding powers should help to 
raise and maintain standards. But arguably, academic standards in 
English higher education have fallen, with the disappearance of 
practices like double-blind marking. Pushes for efficiencies are 
likely to further erode such practices. There is obviously a need to 
counteract trends towards slackening standards and although some 
institutions will want to maintain their market share precisely by 
maintaining exacting standards, this is an instance where the 
market needs some extra help. 
We propose a small levy on businesses who employ more than 200 
graduates to pay for a national charter on academic standards. 
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Money from the levy would be distributed to institutions to fund 
practices like double-blind marking and thorough external 
examination. For too long English businesses, especially in the 
professional and managerial sectors, have relied on a subsidy from 
government and students in order to train their staff. It is time they 
paid something back and in doing so would have a much stronger 
hand in insisting on the rigorous standards they say they want from 
universities. This policy would also protect the brand of English 
universities in the world market, sending a signal that the country 
as a whole is committed to excellence across the board. 
 
Policy: Ban tuition fee-waivers and don’t allow bursaries to count 
towards Access Agreements; invest any money saved into means-
tested fee-waivers and maintenance grants administered through 
the student loans system 
Outcomes: Clear, easy to understand entitlements more likely to 
counter debt aversity; more efficient use of resources; more 
equitable funding of fairer access to higher education; easy to 
understand costs 
Under the auspices of the White Paper, the rather strange situation 
has come about where students, through their fees, are funding 
bursaries for fellow students who may only be slightly poorer than 
them. This is not a particularly equitable way of making university 
more financially viable for poorer students. Neither is it particularly 
efficient: with every university running its own schemes, bursaries 
and fee-waivers are unlikely to be well-targeted at poorer students. 
Making the calculation of how much studying for a degree will cost 
has become incredibly complicated for prospective students, who 
have to factor in fee-waivers (see below), the National Scholarship 
Scheme, entitlement to maintenance grants, and individual 
bursaries on offer from universities.  
It would be much more efficient and equitable, and easy to 
understand for prospective students, if bursaries were not allowed 
to count towards Access Agreement compliance and fee-waivers 
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were banned. Prospective students would be able to understand the 
cost of a course easily. Unfortunately, at the moment an institution 
can offer a degree at fees of £9k (signalling high quality) but bring 
net fees down to, say, £7.5k, with fee waivers. Such mixed signalling 
allows universities to have their cake and eat it in terms of 
marketing their courses, and simply confuses prospective students. 
Any money that was saved as a result of smaller Access Agreements 
with OFFA (money saved through lower fees translating into a 
smaller loan-book) should be re-invested in increasing maintenance 
grants and offering fee-waivers through the student loans system. 
These waivers and grants would be means-tested and thus well-
targeted at the poorest of students. 
Removing bursaries and fee-waivers from Access Agreements 
would allow OFFA to relentlessly focus on outreach programmes, 
which are proven to be the most effective way of widening access to 
university (in addition, of course, to better primary and secondary 
education). In doing so, OFFA needs to become a conduit through 
which best practice can be shared and spread rather than a 
policeman. 
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CONCLUDING REMARK 
Developing and implementing the policies outlined above would 
take political bravery and a willingness to admit that the present 
White Paper, whilst right in its general thrust, is wrong on many 
details. But after surveying the evidence, these are the policies we 
believe would best serve future generations of English students and 
taxpayers. 
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Demos – Licence to Publish 
The work (as defined below) is provided under the terms of this licence ('licence'). The work is protected by 
copyright and/or other applicable law. Any use of the work other than as authorized under this licence is 
prohibited. By exercising any rights to the work provided here, you accept and agree to be bound by the 
terms of this licence. Demos grants you the rights contained here in consideration of your acceptance of 
such terms and conditions. 
 
1 Definitions 
a 'Collective Work' means a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology or encyclopedia, in which the 
Work in its entirety in unmodified form, along with a number of other contributions, constituting separate and 
independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole. A work that constitutes a Collective 
Work will not be considered a Derivative Work (as defined below) for the purposes of this Licence. 
b 'Derivative Work' means a work based upon the Work or upon the Work and other pre-existing works, 
such as a musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which the Work may be recast, transformed, 
or adapted, except that a work that constitutes a Collective Work or a translation from English into another 
language will not be considered a Derivative Work for the purpose of this Licence. 
c 'Licensor' means the individual or entity that offers the Work under the terms of this Licence. 
d 'Original Author' means the individual or entity who created the Work. 
e 'Work' means the copyrightable work of authorship offered under the terms of this Licence. 
f 'You' means an individual or entity exercising rights under this Licence who has not previously violated 
the terms of this Licence with respect to the Work,or who has received express permission from Demos to 
exercise rights under this Licence despite a previous violation. 
 
2 Fair Use Rights 
Nothing in this licence is intended to reduce, limit, or restrict any rights arising from fair use, first sale or other 
limitations on the exclusive rights of the copyright owner under copyright law or other applicable laws. 
 
3 Licence Grant 
Subject to the terms and conditions of this Licence, Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide, royalty-free, 
non-exclusive,perpetual (for the duration of the applicable copyright) licence to exercise the rights in the 
Work as stated below:  
a  to reproduce the Work, to incorporate the Work into one or more Collective Works, and to reproduce 
the Work as incorporated in the Collective Works; 
b  to distribute copies or phonorecords of, display publicly,perform publicly, and perform publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission the Work including as incorporated in Collective Works; The above 
rights may be exercised in all media and formats whether now known or hereafter devised.The above rights 
include the right to make such modifications as are technically necessary to exercise the rights in other 
media and formats. All rights not expressly granted by Licensor are hereby reserved. 
 
4 Restrictions 
The licence granted in Section 3 above is expressly made subject to and limited  by the following 
restrictions: 
a You may distribute,publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the Work only under 
the terms of this Licence, and You must include a copy of, or the Uniform Resource Identifier for, this 
Licence with every copy or phonorecord of the Work You distribute, publicly display,publicly perform, or 
publicly digitally perform.You may not offer or impose any terms on the Work that alter or restrict the terms 
of this Licence or the recipients’ exercise of the rights granted hereunder.You may not sublicence the 
Work.You must keep intact all notices that refer to this Licence and to the disclaimer of warranties.You may 
not distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the Work with any technological 
measures that control access or use of the Work in a manner inconsistent with the terms of this Licence 
Agreement.The above applies to the Work as incorporated in a Collective Work, but this does not require 
the Collective Work apart from the Work itself to be made subject to the terms of this Licence. If You create 
a Collective Work, upon notice from any Licencor You must, to the extent practicable, remove from the 
Collective Work any reference to such Licensor or the Original Author, as requested. 
b You may not exercise any of the rights granted to You in Section 3 above in any manner that is 
primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation.The 
exchange of the Work for other copyrighted works by means of digital filesharing or otherwise shall not be 
considered to be intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation, 
provided there is no payment of any monetary compensation in connection with the exchange of 
copyrighted works. 
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C  If you distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the Work or any 
Collective Works,You must keep intact all copyright notices for the Work and give the Original Author credit 
reasonable to the medium or means You are utilizing by conveying the name (or pseudonym if applicable) 
of the Original Author if supplied; the title of the Work if supplied. Such credit may be implemented in any 
reasonable manner; provided, however, that in the case of a Collective Work, at a minimum such credit will 
appear where any other comparable authorship credit appears and in a manner at least as prominent as 
such other comparable authorship credit. 
 
5 Representations, Warranties and Disclaimer 
A  By offering the Work for public release under this Licence, Licensor represents and warrants that, to 
the best of Licensor’s knowledge after reasonable inquiry: 
i  Licensor has secured all rights in the Work necessary to grant the licence rights hereunder and to 
permit the lawful exercise of the rights granted hereunder without You having any obligation to pay any 
royalties, compulsory licence fees, residuals or any other payments; 
ii  The Work does not infringe the copyright, trademark, publicity rights, common law rights or any other 
right of any third party or constitute defamation, invasion of privacy or other tortious injury to any third party. 
B except as expressly stated in this licence or otherwise agreed in writing or required by applicable 
law,the work is licenced on an 'as is'basis,without warranties of any kind, either express or implied 
including,without limitation,any warranties regarding the contents or accuracy of the work. 
 
6 Limitation on Liability 
Except to the extent required by applicable law, and except for damages arising from liability to a third party 
resulting from breach of the warranties in section 5, in no event will licensor be liable to you on any legal 
theory for any special, incidental,consequential, punitive or exemplary damages arising out of this licence or 
the use of the work, even if licensor has been advised of the possibility of such damages. 
 
7 Termination 
A  This Licence and the rights granted hereunder will terminate automatically upon any breach by You of 
the terms of this Licence. Individuals or entities who have received Collective Works from You under this 
Licence,however, will not have their licences terminated provided such individuals or entities remain in full 
compliance with those licences. Sections 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 will survive any termination of this Licence. 
B  Subject to the above terms and conditions, the licence granted here is perpetual (for the duration of the 
applicable copyright in the Work). Notwithstanding the above, Licensor reserves the right to release the 
Work under different licence terms or to stop distributing the Work at any time; provided, however that any 
such election will not serve to withdraw this Licence (or any other licence that has been, or is required to be, 
granted under the terms of this Licence), and this Licence will continue in full force and effect unless 
terminated as stated above. 
 
8 Miscellaneous 
A  Each time You distribute or publicly digitally perform the Work or a Collective Work, Demos offers to 
the recipient a licence to the Work on the same terms and conditions as the licence granted to You under 
this Licence. 
B  If any provision of this Licence is invalid or unenforceable under applicable law, it shall not affect the 
validity or enforceability of the remainder of the terms of this Licence, and without further action by the 
parties to this agreement, such provision shall be reformed to the minimum extent necessary to make such 
provision valid and enforceable. 
C  No term or provision of this Licence shall be deemed waived and no breach consented to unless such 
waiver or consent shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged with such waiver or consent. 
D  This Licence constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the Work licensed 
here.There are no understandings, agreements or representations with respect to the Work not specified 
here. Licensor shall not be bound by any additional provisions that may appear in any communication from 
You.This Licence may not be modified without the mutual written agreement of Demos and You. 
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This project was supported by:
There has been much controversy over the decision to treble tuition fees
in England, with protests both in and outside parliament. Yet there is
broad agreement among the main political parties that more of the burden
of funding for higher education should be borne by students. The
Government has now set out its vision for the future of the sector, in the
shape of the White Paper on higher education in England, although it
appears to have shelved plans for a higher education bill.
Future Universities examines the White Paper, putting it in historical
perspective and assessing whether it will succeed in achieving its stated
aims. It identifies a significant problem at the core of government policy:
the fact that the generous terms of the new student loans settlement will
create a large amount of unpaid debt for future generations. It argues that
whilst it is correct to shift more of the costs of higher education onto
students, the stringent student cap needed to control the costs of future
unpaid debt is itself the enemy of both improvements in quality and social
mobility.
The paper concludes that, although it is a tough political choice, the
repayment terms of student loans should be made less generous. This way
the state could afford to loosen restrictions on student numbers,
introducing more competition into the sector. These changes would in turn
drive down tuition fees whilst also aiding social mobility by allowing more
people to enter higher education. The end result would be progress
towards a higher education sector genuinely sustainable in two senses:
fiscally sustainable through realistic assumptions about debt repayment
and socially sustainable as it will be able to expand to meet increased
demand.
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